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University of California,
Riverside 92521

For those of you, dear members of the SAGP, who are not in a
position to examine what I have already written on prolepsis ("Epicurean
Semantics," in press) nor to go through the draft of the longer work
I am writing on that subject, I have prepared an abbreviated summary
of my views, an outline of the most important points, which once com
mitted to memory will be an aid to your understanding my lecture in
Philadelphia on December 29th. We require a comprehensive grasp of
the topic, more than an examination of details·
There are precious few texts which can provide reliable information
about Epicurean prolepsis· From what has survived of Epicurus* own
writings there are just three examples of prolepsis, which are mentioned
but not discussed, in connection with our knowledge of the gods, of
justice, and of time — with the last being a case where a prolepsis
is said not to be relevant· In book 28 of the Peri Physeos there is
a mention of the epistemic role of prolepsis, but the context is frag
mentary and interpretation difficult· And in the theoretical section
opening the Letter to Herodotus scholars generally agree that prolepsis
is being discussed, but that term is conspicuously absent from the
discussion. Among Epicureans, Lucretius provides no discussion of
prolepsis in the epistemic section of book 4 nor does he give us any
examples of prolepsis, unless we translate *notitia* in that way,
which policy cannot be adopted uniformly or without prejudicing the
question. The helpful Diogenes of Oenoanda is not helpful here. And
Philodemus raises more difficulties than he solves, because Philoderaus
is an apologist for Epicureanism in the debates with the Stoics and
is consequently prone to using Stoic vocabulary, which is especially
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evident in his Rhetorica and IDe Signis.
The Stoics1 own doctrine of prolepsis as part of their elaborate
conceptual psychology infects the doxographical literature, as well as
the judgment of some scholars who accept the Stoicized reports of
Epicurean prolepseis to conclude that the two schools in this case
made use of the same conceptual device· On the face of it that is
most unlikely, given the differences between the two theories of psy
chology and knowledge, the one being elegantly elaborate and the other
spartanly simple. When one thinks of the details of Stoic theory -phantasia, katalepsis, koinai ennoiai, lekta—

together with the sub

tleties of their physics and logic — in particular their logic of
conditionals— * one can fathom the distance between the Stoa and the
Garden and appreciate that intellectually the Epicureans were always
seen as country cousins. Indeed the most sophisticated reports of
Epicurean doctrine come from Stoicized sources, from Cicero to Sextus.
What these same sources say about Epicurean prolepsis is always
from a Stoic perspective, even when the author (Diogenes Laertius,
Cicero) is trying to be fair. Diogenes Laertius1 report of Epicurean
prolepsis is painfully groping, looking for the right Stoic expressions
to describe the device: "By prolepsis they mean a kind of katalepsis
or right opinion or concept or universal thought ( consensus omnium )
stored in the mind --that is, the memory of a frequent appearance from
the outside." (D.L. X 33) Diogenes * examples should be no less sus
pect: "As soon as man is spoken of, straightaway due to prolepsis
his typos too is thought of ( noeitai ) with the sensory faculties
leading the way." The expression *noeitaiT arouses my suspicions as
does the ensuing sentence: "What primarily underlies every word is
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evident and we should not have started out to seek what is sought had
we not already recognized it·" What seems evident to me is that Diogenes
is trying to redeem his clumsy, anachronistic account by aping two lines
from the Letter to Herodotus and in doing so to subvert the doctrine,
substituting ’word’ for ’utterance1 and suggesting that prolepsis in
itiates investigations, as it does for the Stoics, where Epicurus is
talking about settling disputes, obviating further apodeixis by pro
viding the necessary evidence.
Cicero, in my view, is a much more careful historian of philosophy
and indeed a good philosopher, but what he says about Epicurean prolepsis
has difficulties of its own. I have no quarrel with his remark that
Epicurus was the first to use the word prolepsis nor even that this
prolepsis informs us that the gods are blessed and immortal. After all,
Epicurus says much the same thing about the gods in his Letter to
Menoeceus (123-124). Furthermore, Epicurus says that the truth about
the gods is a koine noesis, and Cicero reports that accurately enough.
But unfortunately Epicurus does not tell us how such a koine noesis
might be derived from a prolepsis. Listening to Cicero would have us
believe that the Epicureans derive their information concerning the
character of the gods from a universal consensus, natural intuitions
("insitas eorura vel potius innatas cognitiones"), information which
is stamped on the mind ("eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos
et beatos habereraus" De Nat. Peor. I 43-45). And Cicero goes on to
maintain that it is the universal nature of this consensus which makes
it necessarily true. For my mind there is too much Stoicism in Cicero’s
account to allow me to accept this testimony lock, stock, and bagel,
especially when one considers that Cicero glosses over the difference
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between apprehension of the gods1 existence, using the mind as a sixth
sense

■
— what Epicurus calls epibole tes dianoias—

and recognition of

the gods* character, which I take to be the role of prolepsis« In short,
we can only make selective use of the testimonies of Diogenes Laertius
and Cicero, not to mention the others· What we select to accept requires
an independent understanding of the Epicurean doctrine·
We do not even know what role prolepsis is supposed to play in
Epicurean theory, though sources agree that role was discussed in
Epicurus* Canon· The criteria listed by Diogenes and Cicero are threefold,
consisting of aisthesis, prolepsis, and pathe

“ though Epicurus only

used the word kriterion to refer to the sense faculties· But this
threefold division is more like a troika, with each of the three going
off in a different direction. It is not a criterion of truth, because
the pathe are hitched up as vehicles for choice and avoidance· And
aisthesis is represented as the criterion for knowledge, although
Epicurus himself listed both aistheseis and pathe as having this role.
According to Diogenes and Cicero, then. Epicurean prolepsis has neither
a judgmental role to play, which they say is the job of aisthesis,
nor an ethical role to play, the job of the pathe.
So, what is the role prolepsis is supposed to have in the Epicurean
Canon? If the Epicureans were Stoics the answer would be easy enough,
since the Stoics divided philosophy into three parts ■
— adding logic to
the parts recognized by the Epicureans: natural philosophy and ethics·
Our sources are emphatic that the Epicureans did not give logic a separate
status. But regarding the Stoics, Diogenes Laertius reports that some
divide logic into two parts. One is called peri kanonon kai kriterion
and consists of the phantasiai, while the other constitutes t_o horikon,
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definitions which are the work of common notions. Stoic ennoiai. To a
Stoicizing historian this might seem to be the role of prolepsis in the
Epicurean troika, but it couldn’t be, since the testimony is adamant
that the Epicureans denied the value of definitions. Furthermore, the
Canon which is said to provide this troika is also said not to have
an independent status, independent of natural philosophy.
It is a real possibility, then, that the troika listed by Diogenes
and Cicero has been Stoicized, and that whatever trichotomy may be
present in Epicurus’ Canon concerned a threefold division of perceptual
evidence, consisting of the evidence of the sense faculties ( aistheseis ),
the evidence of the experience of pleasure and pain ( the pathe ),
and something else. Diogenes even suggests what this something else
might be

and Epicurus confirms it: the sixth sense, epibole tes dianoias,

where the mind itself is sensitive to especially fine atomic images
which penetrate it and trigger recognitions. At this point. Epicurean
prolepsis as a separate criterion, in the Stoic sense, seems to dis
appear from Epicurus’ Canon.
With astonishing unanimity, scholars put prolepsis back into the
Canon and into a pivotal role by reading it into Herodotus 37-38, where
Epicurus prefaces his arguments on natural philosophy with a discussion
of his theory of evidence. The word prolepsis is missing from the dis
cussion, but this might possibly be an inconspicuous omission, if one
agrees with Sedley’s suggestion that Epicirus had not yet invented the
word, since the only mention of the term in the Letter to Herodotus at
#72 could easily be a later addition. And in the passage in question the
term proton ennoema seems to be a convenient standin. What is most
compelling about this interpretation is that Cicero, Sextus, and Diogenes
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Laertius, among others, all make a claim about Epicurean prolepsis which
is echoed in this passage: namely, that having a prolepsis is necessary
for conducting any empirical investigation or answering any problem of
natural philosophy:
First of all, Herodotus, it is necessary to grasp what underlies
our utterances [ ta hypotetagmena tois phthongois...dei eilephenai ],
so that by referring to them we may have a means of judging
our opinions, inquiries, and problems, and not give endless
demonstrations which leave everything undetermined or use empty
utterances® For the primary thought for every utterance must be
seen [ anagke gar to proton ennoema kath* hekaston phthongon
blepesthai ] and there be no need of further proof [ apodeixeos ],
if we are to have a point of reference for inquiries, problems,
and opinions. Wherefore it is necessary to keep a close watch
over our perceptions [ aistheseis ], that is to say over our
current apprehendings (whether they be mental or any of the sense
organs) [ tas parousas epibolas eite dianoias eithT hotou depote
ton kriterion ], as well as over our present feelings [ ta
hyparchonta pathe ], so that we may be able to infer what awaits
confirmation and what is not evident.

(Her. 37-38, von der Muehll)

Without arguing in detail, let me simply point out that if what turns
out to be prolepsis is being discussed here, prolepseis are not
exclusively what underlies our utterances. The primary bit of information,
or Frotofl ennoema, for every utterance must encompass more than prolepsis
in any case.
What underlies our utterances is to settle questions of natural
philosophy, rather than initiate them. The first part of this passage
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does not present an Epicurean answer to the paradox of inquiry, but rather
an answer to the question of what settles investigations: namely, the
point of reference which our utterances are about. And the second half
of the passage tells us how to find that point of reference by lisitng
the trichotomy which Epicurus mentions elsewhere: the five sense faculties,
the sixth sense, and the feelings of pleasure and pain. It is the empirical
evidence derived in this way which will put an end to demonstrations,
which will decide questions, which will give reference to our utterances,
and most importantly will itself not need demonstration, because, as
Epicurus was notorious for saying, perceptual evidence is always true.
Now we do not even need to read prolepsis into this passage to make
good sense of it. And in any case, the Stoic role for prolepsis, which
is analogous to that of the ennoiai, the initial concepts which provide
a starting point for inquiry along the line of their definitions, defining
what it is one is looking for, this Stoic use of prolepsis is not what
Epicurus is talking about in this passage. Defined concepts won’t answer
empirical questions. Consequently, if prolepseis

are included in our

passage, then their role is clearly an evidential one, providing some
reference point about the nature of things, in the way that aisthesis
does. Like aisthesis, then, prolepseis must make claims about the world,
not just provide concepts with which to make those claims, something
the Stoics were quite concerned about, the Epicureans not.
Epicurus’ own examples support the point that prolepseis are
evidential claims. As we have seen, one such prolepsis is that the
gods are blessed and immortal. When Epicurus makes this claim in Menoeceus
123-124, he contrast prolepseis with false judgments about the character
of the gods. And when he mentions the prolepsis of justice, the author
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of the Kyriai Doxai — presumably Epicurus—

presents the claim that justice

is what serves the needs of social intercourse. Apparently, prolepseis
take the form of claims about the way things are. These claims are facts
about the world, not mere opinions. So prolepsis enjoys the evidential
status aisthesis does.
Consequently I see no foundation for the most common interpretation,
that Epicurean prolepsis is some kind of conceptual device. The most
popular version of this thesis has been that prolepseis are the meanings
of individual words, as they might also have been for the Stoics, in
dividual concepts which when strung together in the appropriate way
would provide meaning to sentences, constituting lekta· Now I have argued
against this interpretation in "Epicurean Semantics,” where I pointed
out that we should take the evidence of Plutarch and Sextus seriously,
that there is nothing in Epicureanism comparable to what the Stoics
claimed was the significance ( t_o semainomenon ) of voiced sounds. The
Epicureans made do with just voiced sounds, or utterances, and the events
happening in the world which those utterances referred to. Attention to
everything which the Epicureans say about the origin and character of
language suggests that utterances label states of the world, or else
they are vacuous sounds. The prolepseis, then, are not vehicles of
meaning, but conveyances of evidence making claims on the world, not
making sense of our vocabulary.
Some would maintain that nevertheless prolepseis are mental re
presentations, though what they represent are complex ideas about the
world. This too seems unlikely. The authority of perception and the
authority of our feelings would be called into question, with disastrous
consequences for Epicurean empiricism, were it the case that what it is
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we see or how it is we feel were somehow dependent upon our own sub
jective perspective and viewpoint· The Epicureans were adamant on the
mechanical, automatic character of perception and feeling, which somehow
guaranteed the information we received from our senses was information
about the state of the world, as opposed to our state of mind· The purely
referential character of what it is we perceive and the pleasure and pain
we feel is what guarantees the epistemic authority of aisthesis and pathe·
Now it appears not just from secondary sources but also from what
Epicurus states in book 28 of his Peri Physeos that prolepsis also
enjoys such evidential authority. This would require that the claims
of prolepsis have the same referential fixity as that enjoyed by aisthesis
and the pathe. Indeed, it is only if this is so that prolepseis could
possibly be construed as at least part of what underlies our utterances,
as part of the proton ennoema behind every utterance, which is the point
of reference for all investigation.
We conclude that prolepsis for the Epicureans makes evidential claims
on the nature of reality. But we still need to know how such prolepseis
are generated and what sorts of events in the world they describe. To answer
either question is to offer conjecture. One of the controversies in the
literature concerns whether Epicurean prolepsis is restricted to abstract
entities, as the example of justice would seem to suggest, or to individual
things, as Diogenes’ examples suggest and the example of the character
of the gods speaks in favor of. What complicates conjecture is the very
real possibility that over time the Epicureans may have changed their
mind on the range of prolepseis. Both Diogenes and Cicero talk of
revisions of the younger Epicureans in this context, and Plutarch and
Sextus make similar suggestions. It could be the case that at first
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prolepsis played a rather minor role with a restricted range and over time
the range extended·
From the examples we do have in Epicurus it seems that prolepsis is
concerned with the character of a thing or a state of affairs — what it
is to be just, as opposed to what the instantiations of justice are,
what the character of the gods is, as opposed to who the gods are. Given
Epicurean epistemic realism, these claims on the character of some thing
or state must be seen as claims on the world, so that prolepsis, like
aisthesis for a realist, is ambiguous between the psychological act of
apprehension and the content discerned, some feature of the world. In the
case of prolepsis what is discerned should be some abiding character
in things, as opposed to some temporary appearance. Not surprisingly.
Epicurean atomism suggests the need for these two different kinds of
information. Since all that exists are simply atoms moving in the void,
on any occasion what one perceives is, as it were, a time slice of a
continuous process ----so the apple looks green now. It is also the case
that certain atomic configurations are relatively abiding in any par
ticular cosmos. And so in our world water has a particular atomic
arrangement and iron another. Information about the one, the state of
current appearances, is not the same as information about the other,
the relatively abiding state of nature.
The history of PlatoTs Forms and Aristotle*s natural kinds should
have made Epicurus more sensitive to this issue than Democritus would
have been, and in any case this sensitivity to the abiding structures
in nature is certainly obvious from the De Rerum Natura. There is clearly
a need for information about these abiding structures in natural philosophy
and this need can be satisfied in part by Epicurean inference and confirmation
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But it also appears that we can recognize the abiding character in
perceived things and states· We recognize justice to be what serves
social interest, the gods to be blessed and immortal· Such recognitions
are part of the evidence, not part of our inferences· And prolepsis,
it seems, constitutes such recognitions·
The question how prolepsis differs from aisthesis becomes, on my
view, mostly a matter of degree. On a strict view of perception we
perceive only sights and sounds, smells and tastes: colors, shapes,
specific noises and other such primitive phenomena. To perceive
a man or a tower in the distance would then require a more elaborate
psychological process. At what point this more elaborate process becomes
something other than perception is difficult to say. Broadly speaking,
recognizing a tower in the distance remains aisthesis, not being an
inference. But it could well be that at some point Epicurus or Epicureans
wanted to discriminate some more sophisticated recognitions as the work
of prolepsis, possibly recognitions requiring repeated experiences so
as to make familiar lingering characteristics or forms. A passage in
Philoderaus1 De. Signis claims there is a prolepsis for human nature,
just as Diogenes Laertius suggested that there is a persistent form
recognized throughout the instances of accumulated experience of seeing
a man or seeing a horse. Yet judging from Epicurus’ own examples, perception
seems to take on the responsibility for recognizing natural structures,
leaving prolepsis for the more abstract characteristics requiring more
than the operation of the sense organs but the mind as well, the case
of justice, the case of the gods1 character.
If we could determine how prolepseis arise, we might be in a
position to determine their range. As I understand prolepsis, it cannot

glidden, p. 12

be the work of any particular sense organ, but it is a perceptual recognition
of the mind as a result of the work of the separate sense organs· But if
we assume it is the work of dianoia, it is still something we perceive
in the world, not a rational reconstruction or hypothesis· Here the case
of the gods is instructive. The mind, operating as a sixth sense sensitive
to especially fine eidola, perceives the gods, just as it perceives
phantoms in dreams. I suggest that this same apprehension of the mind,
epibole tes dianoias, can perceive persistent characteristics characterizing
the things it or the other sense faculties perceive, the sorts of things
these things are. And so we have a prolepsis that the gods are blessed and
immortal, over and above having a vision of them. Presumably these
prolepseis are formed in the mind as a result of repeated experiences,
allowing us to get acquainted with the persistent characters of things.
As accumulated information, these prolepseis would be common to all
familiar with the same sorts of experiences.
My best guess is that in Epicurean theory prolepsis was first
understood as a type of epibole tes dianoias, and the two remained
associated with each other as perceptual activities of dianoia, sometimes
taking in mental visions, sometimes recognizing natural kinds and
characters. In the case of the gods it would have been easy to confuse
the two activities as Cicero did. And it is easy to understand how the
recognition of natural types could come to be identified with primitive
concepts, which the Stoics wanted.
I hope, dear members of the SAGP, that this synopsis of ray views
will help show you the way to ataraxia, if not Philadelphia.

